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III ANALYSIS/APPLICATIONI FACTS
The plaintiffs filed suit against Circuit City in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia alleging race discrimination by the Circuit City
Headquarters in Richmond, Virginia in their promotion
process. At trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict
in favor of the plaintiffs.2 The jury found that Circuit City
had (1), engaged in a pattern or practice of race discrim-
ination, and (2), in October 1994, wrongfully denied
plaintiff Renee Lowery promotion to Management
Recruiting Supervisor, and (3), wrongfully denied Lisa
Peterson promotions to Assistant Supervisor in
November and December of 1994.1 Twelve other claims
of discrimination were denied.4
Circuit City moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict as a matter of law claiming that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that Circuit
City engaged in a pattern or practice of race discrimina-
tion or discrimination toward plaintiffs.5 The question
before the District Court was whether there was a legal-
ly sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
have found for the prevailing party when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.'
II HOLDING
The District Court held that the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably find
that Circuit City engaged in a pattern or practice of race
discrimination.7 In regard to Renee Lowery and Lisa
Peterson, the Court found that the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that
Circuit City's explanations for passing over each of the
plaintiff's was pretext for a discriminatory intent.'
'McKnight, 1997 WL 328634, 1.




'Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 E2d 316,318
(4th Cir.), cert. Denied, 506 U.S. 872, 113 S.Ct. 206,121 L.Ed.2d
147 (1992).
7McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634 (E.D.Va.), 1.
8McKnight, 1997 WL 328634, 1.
91997 WL 328634, 1.
Circuit City attacked the jury's finding of a pattern or
practice of race discrimination on two grounds.9 First,
Circuit City contended that a pattern or practice claim
may only be brought in a certified class action or a suit
brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission."° Circuit City argued that the decertifica-
tion of the class in this suit rendered the submission of
the pattern or practice question to the jury improper."
Circuit City cited the Fourth Circuit's decision in Stastny
v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company as
direct support for their argument. 2
The Stastny court had indicated that class action
certification was dependent inter alia upon the exis-
tence of a pattern or practice of discrimination affecting
a perceptible class of protected employees. 3 Due to the
Stastny plaintiff's failure to meet the class certification
requirements, the 4th Circuit found that the class action
should have been withdrawn and the class allegations
stricken. '
4
Circuit City asserts two principles could be drawn
from the Stastny decision. First, that class decertifica-
tion decides whether there is a pattern or practice of
discrimination." Second, that a pattern or practice
claim is not a claim separate from a class action and
cannot, therefore, be used in individual discrimination
claims.6
The District Court rejected Circuit City's interpreta-
tion of the Stastny holding, ruling that the Stastny court
had not addressed the question of whether a pattern or
practice claim could be maintained apart from a class
action suit. '7 The Stastny court merely held that where
the class failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23, a
court should deny certification and bar the pursuit of a
'Old.
"McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634, 1 (E.D.Va.).
'2Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 E2d 267 (4th
Cir. 1980).
'3Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 E 2d 267,274
(4th Cir. 1980).
'Stastny, 628 E 2d at 276.
'"McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634, 2 (E.D.Va.).
6McKnight, 1997 WL 328634, at 2.
71997 WL 328634, at 2.
separate pattern or practice claim. " The District Court
found that its decision to deny class certification in
McKnight did not fall into the Stastny category, because
plaintiffs' motion for certification was granted for pur-
poses of better case management.' 9
According to the District Court, the goal of class cer-
tification, efficiency, could not be met through class
action certification of Plaintiff's claims versus Circuit
City. In fact, the court had expressly held that the class
did meet the Rule 23 requirements in its original certifi-
cation based on the subjectivity of the criteria used in
the decision making at Circuit City.20 The nature of the
decertification by the court allowed each plaintiff to pur-
sue the class-wide pattern or practice claim despite the
individual nature of each claim.2 Therefore, the District
Court held that the pattern or practice question was
properly presented to the jury."
Circuit City's second argument asserted that even if
the pattern or practice question was properly submitted
to the jury, the evidence presented to the jury at trial was
legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
2 3
International Bbd. Of Teamsters v. United States dictat-
ed that a pattern or practice claim demands that the
plaintiff "prove more than the mere occurrence of isolat-
ed or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts."24 The
Teamsters District Court analyzed the evidence under
this rule and required the plaintiff to establish, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, "that racial discrimination
was the company's standard operating procedure-the
regular rather than the unusual practice.""
Circuit City attacked both the statistical and narrative
evidence presented at trial.As to statistics, plaintiff's expert,
Dr. Harless, had aggregated the promotions he examined
for discrimination. 6 Circuit City argued that its promotion
decisions are decentralized and that therefore Dr. Harless'
aggregated statistics were not legally significant. 7
Circuit City again cited Stastny in support of its posi-
tion.The Stastny court declared that "locus of autonomy"
was a "critical factor" in the inquiry into the commonali-
ty of the employment decision making.28 In light of evi-
'8Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 E 2d 267,278
(4th Cir. 1980).
'"McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634, 2 (E.D.Va.).




"International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324,336,97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
"International Bbd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. at 336.
6McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634,2 (E.D.Va.).
2McKnight, 1997 WL 328634, at 2.
'Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 E2d 267,279
dence indicating that the Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Company's multiple facilities retained sub-
stantial autonomy and unique labor pools, the Fourth
Circuit rejected statewide statistical evidence which was
not broken down by individual facility.2 9 The Fourth
Circuit determined that evidence of discrimination
found in statewide data could incorrectly implicate inno-
cent facilities. Relying on Stastny, Circuit City argued that
its promotion decisions at the various branches were not
centralized, rendering Dr. Harless' analyses legally
insignificant.
30
The District Court found that the plaintiff's situation
in McKnight differed from the Stastny situation. The
challenge by the plaintiffs concerned the promotion
record of Circuit City headquarters, not at its multiple
facilities.3' According to evidence presented at trial, the
Circuit City headquarters functions as a single unit with
one Human Resources department.32 The District Court
cited the testimony of Kate Powis in its December 3,
1996 Memorandum Opinion. Powis stated that all entry-
level employees, white and black, are hired into a com-
mon pool and are equally qualified. 33Thus they represent
a labor pool appropriate for statistical research on the
promotion rate of minorities.34 The Circuit City policy of
training and promoting from within should thus lend to
comparable promotion rates for the equally qualified
white and black employees." Harless concluded that
they had not done so. 6
Circuit City disputed the legal sufficiency of Dr.
Harless' results and cited its own expert, Dr. Haworth, to
prove that no pattern or practice of discrimination exist-
ed at Circuit City. Dr. Haworth's analysis was conducted
on the actual promotion process, department by depart-
ment, and then aggregated the final figures. 7 Circuit City
labeled the three instances of discrimination found by
the jury "isolated" in light of the 34 promotions accepted
by 17 black employees over the same time period.
Circuit City argued that these "isolated" cases were not a
legally sufficient basis for the jury's finding of a pattern
or practice of discrimination.38
(4th Cir.1980).
-Stastny, 628 E2d at 279-80.
"°McKnigbt v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634,2 (E.D.Va.).
3'McKnight, 1997 WL 328634, at 2.
321997 WL 328634, at 2.
3'December 3rd Memorandum Opinion.
3'December 3rd Memorandum Opinion.
31McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634,4 (E.D.Va.).
'McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634,2 (E.D.Va.).
"McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634,4 (E.D.Va.).
"McKnight, 1997 WL 328634, at 4.
The District Court rejected Circuit City's analysis of
the evidence.The evidence presented by both Dr. Harless
and Dr. Haworth, as well as the rebuttal evidence of the
plaintiffs, were all evidentiaryA9 The weight to be given to
the evidence was a question for the jury, and their deci-
sion could not be faulted.40 The District Court gave par-
ticular attention to the plaintiff's rebuttal testimony. On
rebuttal, Dr. Harless illustrated that Haworth's own statis-
tical analysis could be the basis for a finding of a pattern
or practice of discrimination.The promotion rates iin Dr.
Haworth's aggregated analysis differed by 4.5 standard
deviations between white and black employees. 4' Such a
variance could be found to be sufficient evidence of a
pattern or practice of discrimination.42 E.E. 0. C v. Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond proclaimed that, while
courts "should be extremely cautious in drawing any
conclusions from standard deviations in the range of one
to three ... standard deviations of more than three" could
be indicative of a "disparity."
43
Circuit City attacked evidence presented by the
plaintiffs, claiming that statistical evidence was insuffi-
cient to support a pattern or practice finding when dis-
puted by other evidence." Circuit City proposed that
each of the plaintiff's witnesses presented at trial failed
to establish a prima facie of discrimination under the
McDonnell-Douglas test45 and their testimony was there-
fore legally insufficient. Circuit City also contended that
the evidence presented by these witnesses was insuffi-
cient to rebut as pretext Circuit City's evidence of legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged pro-
motions.
46
The District Court rejected each of Circuit City's
arguments. First, the Court found that each of the anec-
dotal witnesses had in fact established a prima facie case
of discrimination. Secondly, the Court discovered ample
evidence of pretext. Evidence of "subjective decision-
making ... , failure to post job openings in a uniform man-
ner, hand-picking the employees for promotions, racially




43E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 E2d
633,648 (4th Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 867,
104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984) (quoting E.E.O.C. v.
American Nat' Bank, 652 E2d 1176, 1192 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 923,103 S.Ct. 235,74 L.Ed.2d 186 (1982)).
"McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634, 5 (E.D.Va.).
4McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802-03,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).The McDonnell Douglas
test defines the requisite prima facie case as a showing by the
plaintiff that he or she: 1. Belongs to a racial minority, 2.Applied
and was qualified for a vacant position the employer was trying
derogatory remarks, and numerous other instances of
discrimination" were unearthed at trial.47 This evidence
was supplemented by the plaintiff's evidence of a failure
to monitor promotions in order to avoid discrimination,
a perceived threat of retaliation for claims of discrimina-
tion within the Circuit City hierarchy, and a failure to
respond to claims of discrimination. 4 The United States
District Court concluded that the jury could reasonably
conclude that the non-discriminatory reasons offered by
Circuit City for not promoting the plaintiffs were mere
pretext for the discrimination found in the plaintiff's evi-
dence.
Circuit City challenged the jury verdict on the plain-
tiff's individual claims of discrimination. The District
Court laid down the analytical framework for the plain-
tiff's claims of individual discriminatory treatment under
Title VII. The applicable framework is the three part
McDonnell Douglas test.
Throughout the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the
burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. First, the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case, either through the
McDonnell Douglas test or the Teamsters test.4 9 The
Supreme Court indicated that the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie elements were not the ultimate test, but that
they effectively depicted the general principles of a Title
VII plaintiff's burden to present "evidence adequate to
create an inference that an employment decision was
based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the
Act."" This burden can be carried by a showing of a pat-
tern or practice of discriminatory hiring practices."
Should a prima facie case be successfully estab-
lished, the second part of the McDonnell Douglas test
comes into play.A prima facie showing must be rebutted
by the defendant "articulating legitimate non-discrimina-
tory business reasons for the challenged actions."2 Then,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the
reasons put forth by the defendant in rebutting plaintiffs'
prima facie case were merely pretextual. To prove pre-
to fill, 3.Was passed over for the position, and 4.After the rejec-
tion, the employer continued to seek applicants for the open
position of the plaintiff's qualifications.
'6McKnigbt v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634, 5 (E.D.Va.).
4McKnigbt v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634 (E.D.Va.).
4
.McKnight, 1997 WL 328634, at 6.
49International Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
"International Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324,358,97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
5"International Bbd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324,359, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1867,52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
2McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634 (E.D.Va.).
text, the plaintiff must show that "the reason was false,
and that discrimination was the real reason," for the chal-
lenged actions."
The District Court applied this analysis to the indi-
vidual claims of plaintiffs Renee Lowery and Lisa
Peterson. Circuit City challenged Ms. Lowery's claim on
the grounds that she had failed the prove that the person
promoted to the Supervisor of Management Recruiting
in her place did not possess skills which she lacked that
were essential to the position. The District Court dis-
agreed. The court stated: "[I] nstead of creating specific,
objective qualifications for the position before making
the hiring decision, Circuit City essentially asserts that
the qualifications necessary for the Supervisor position
are any qualifications that the successful candidate pos-
sesses which Lowery does not possess."14 The court con-
cluded that a reasonable jury could find this explanation
by Circuit City to be pretext."
Lisa Peterson was twice denied promotion to the
same position. In each case, the court determined that a
reasonable jury could have viewed Circuit City's expla-
nation to be mere pretext for discrimination. In the first
case, Circuit City attempted to weigh the facts for the
jury, something the District Court declined to do. In the
second instance, the evidence clearly illustrated that the
person promoted in place of Ms. Peterson, "had no prior
[relevant] experience, no knowledge of the operating
functions of the bank, no background in contacting cus-
tomers, and no knowledge of the computer system
used... [and]... was failing in her [present] job... * "5The
District Court found that these facts allowed a reason-
able jury to conclude that Circuit City's reasons for deny-
ing promotion to Ms. Peterson were pretext for discrim-
ination.57
IV CONCLUSION
The District Court's decision in McKnight may serve
as a guide for employer promotion practices in the
future. Under the McKnight mandate, employers are
forced to implement promotion strategies that create the
reasonable pretext necessary to thwart claims of dis-
53St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,113 S.Ct.
2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed. 2d 407 (1993).
5'McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated, 1997 WL
328634,7 (E.D.Va.).
crimination from individual employees. In order to attain
this goal, the employer's plan must define the specific
credentials indispensable to promotion to each position
and apply them in each case.The applicants to each posi-
tion must be analyzed under this standard, and deviations
must not occur.
The use of such a plan would potentially allow an
employer to avoid liability for discrimination claims. In
order to ensure the practical effect of the new promo-
tion plan, and further the employer's protection from
claims of discrimination, a review system should be
implemented. This process would scrutinize the promo-
tion process and results in order to guarantee that a sta-
tistically reasonable number of minority promotions
occur.
McKnigbt has effects for potential plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' attorneys as well. McKnigbt outlines a plan of
attack for the plaintiff's attorney when investigating a
potential employer defendant. Clearly, the more subjec-
tive the promotion process, the more readily a discrimi-
nation case can be built.This case construction is greatly
benefited by evidence of the promotion process,
employee status, and promotion history.
The McKnight decision may also close some doors
to potential plaintiffs.As described above, employers can
have a promotion and hiring process that, if successfully
followed, is difficult to challenge. In short, the McKnight
decision brings some order to the realm of discrimina-
tion litigation and its real world effect should prove ben-
eficial. The alteration of employer promotion processes
to the McKnigbt standard should eliminate much of the
discrimination faced in the workplace by forcing
employers to rigidly follow a pattern which, by its terms,
eliminates most of the bias which can enter into the typ-
ical hiring and promotion scheme. Employer and
employee are each buoyed by a system meant to allow
the examination of the hiring and promotion process to
ensure fairness.
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161997WL 328634 at 9.
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